MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary, United States Intelligence
                   Board

SUBJECT   : Proposal for a United States Intelligence Staff
                   College (USISC)

    1. Attached is a prospectus for an extended advanced training
program for senior USIB intelligence officers at the branch chief
level or above.

        a. Annex 1 is a general outline of course content containing
    a number of units of instruction and the approximate time (emphasis)
    suggested for each unit of instruction.

        b. Annex 2 is a discussion of some of the administrative
    considerations for setting up and operating such a program.

        c. This memorandum makes a proposal, discusses some of the
    justifications for such a program, a rationalization of some of
    the principal objections, and makes specific recommendations for
    planning for and developing the program.

        d. For convenience of reference, this program will be referred
    to hereinafter as the United States Intelligence Staff College
    (USISC).

    2. **Proposal.** A United States Intelligence Staff College should
be organized under the sponsorship of the United States Intelligence
Board to train senior officers of the USIB agencies as a mechanism for:

        a. Improving working relationships between agencies and thus
    ensuring more effective coordination.

        b. Developing a common core of understanding in senior officers
    of the "intelligence community" with regard to U.S. intelligence
    capability.

        c. Providing potentially valuable intelligence officers of the
    USIB agencies with the knowledge which will facilitate moving into
    positions of greater responsibility in the field of intelligence,
    as well as improving the efficiency and capability of their own
    organizations. This program should be comparable in level to
    courses of instruction offered at the various Department of Defense
    Colleges and the Department of State's senior diplomat seminars.

3. **Justification.** Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 will deal with specific subjects intending to clarify some of the reasons why such a program is required in the "intelligence community". In addition, it might be well to emphasize at this point that the Military Services and the Department of State have found it expedient to operate similar programs aimed at advancing the competence of their senior people. These programs are, however, primarily oriented to the military arts and to diplomacy. Although intelligence officers attend these programs, the focus of instruction only partially fulfills the needs of the intelligence officer. Why must intelligence officers eat the crumbs from these boards when a worthwhile program can be developed which will focus on the intelligence officer's needs?

4. **Intelligence and Policy.** Traditionally, intelligence supports policy or execution of policy. The policymaker or executor of policy turns to intelligence to provide the information needed for competent decisions. Since this is the case, intelligence is subject to vagaries of the policymakers. Formal management patterns have been distilled from these policy requirements. These patterns result in intelligence policy directives, divisions of labor, and formal organization. However, a substantial amount of the policy requirements must be handled by the existent structure on an "ad hoc" basis. Also, intelligence is required to anticipate policy requirements, despite the fact that the intelligence action normally lags the receipt of policy requirements.

Assuming the validity of the above, it follows that the senior intelligence officer must have a thorough knowledge of operation of the policy and planning structure he supports. He must know why and how intelligence policy reacts to policy planning, and he should have sufficient understanding of policy trends and procedures so that he can relate the functions of his own organization to the policy climate.

5. **Intelligence and Secrecy.** Since intelligence is part of the basis for policy which will become apparent at some later time, it is essential that intelligence protect the interest or potential interest of the policy level from inadvertent, or other types of exposure, from those against whom policy will be directed. Furthermore, certain techniques used in collection of data would, if exposed, either shut off the flow of future information or lead to national embarrassment. The key security devices used, aside from physical and personal security, are compartmentation and "need-to-know". A peculiar paradox exists in the intelligence field in that our primary mission is to communicate facts, conclusions while at the same time, for valid reasons, we must

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control the communication of how we procure data, and, to a lesser
extent, how we process data. Normally, the efficiency of any organi-
zation can be measured in terms of the communication within it, both
vertically and laterally. Compartmentation limits communication and
thereby hinders efficiency. In a security, or compartmented organi-
zation, there must be some level at which sufficient information is
available "across the board" to facilitate medium level planning and
decisions. This "across the board" information can be both communi-
cated and controlled in a training program for senior officers.

6. **Intelligence and Coordination.** The problem of coordination
to achieve effective results in the intelligence community is a stagger-
ing one. An examination of the "community" and its functions reveal a
number of major factors which greatly influence coordination. These
are: a. A policy-directed division of labor, b. Multiplicity of
organizations (including a number of non-USIB agencies which have foreign
intelligence functions), c. Bigness, d. Lack of uniformity in organi-
zational patterns for similar functions, and e. Interdependence to accom-
plish the over-all intelligence mission.

We are not concerned here with critiquing the sense of the above.
This is what we have. However, it is useful to examine the above points
in the light of their effect on intelligence managers.

a. **Policy directed division of labor.** Most intelligence
managers are aware of the policy directives which directly affect
their own organizations. How many managers understand the
rationale of the total division of labor in their own agency or
among intelligence agencies? It is fairly obvious that the
intelligence manager must understand the division of labor and
the policy which established it in order for him to better under-
stand his role in the total picture and to know how he can best
contribute to it. He should have an adequate knowledge of the
roles of other organizations in this picture and particularly
those with whom he normally deals or could deal with in giving or
receiving support.

b. **Multiplicity of organizations.** The intelligence community
in its broadest sense includes a large number of intelligence
organizations in government outside of USIB. Even in USIB a
relatively large number of intelligence organizations are repre-
sented. In order for the intelligence manager to properly utilize
the capabilities of the "intelligence community", he should have
a fairly detailed knowledge of the structure and functions of all
the components of the community. This is not a criticism of the
liaison function, nor does it mean that the intelligence officer
would or should ignore established liaison. Rather, the manager
knowing external capability can 1) properly plan his utilization
of support available elsewhere, and 2) by knowing of the existence

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of such support and exploiting it can accomplish certain
parts of his mission which otherwise would be difficult
or impossible.

c. Bigness. This should be examined in conjunction with
compartmentation and control. Normally, the bigger the opera-
tion, whether government or business, the greater the problem
of achieving effective coordination. Unless effective coordi-
nation exists, subunits in a compartmented organization tend
to become isolated and bureaucratic inflexibility develops.
In extreme instances the unit can rationalize its function to
where, for the unit, its job becomes the sole reason for the
existence of intelligence. Such isolation in big organizations
can lead to internal procedures, for the convenience of the
unit, which place unbearable loads on other organizations they
deal with. Bigness also leads to staff controls which, if un-
checked, can hamper or upset subordinate command decisions and
line functions. The intelligence manager should know how his
organization fits into a larger pattern and the proper relation-
ship with lateral organizations.

d. Lack of uniformity in organizational patterns. Despite
a rational division of labor in the "intelligence community",
we still find that it is necessary to have units with similar
functions in order to satisfy national and departmental intelli-
gence requirements. Because of their responsibilities, intelli-
gence organizations find it necessary to coordinate information,
hypotheses, conclusions, administrative matters and the like.
In one organization the organization may be based on a functional
premise; in another on a regional premise (sometimes inconsistent
from organization to organization); in still another on a command
structure. Often an intelligence officer in organization A seeks
to find his opposite number in organization B. It is conceivable
that he does not have an opposite number, but rather the sum of
the functions of several persons in organization B represent his
opposite number. The intelligence manager or planner should be
aware that such is the case so that he can conduct effective
liaison with other organizations.

e. Interdependence among intelligence organizations. In the
field of national intelligence, interdependence is, of course,
well established as a policy and in the programs which fall within
the definition of national intelligence. In the field of depart-
mental intelligence, despite the division of labor, the catholic
interests of departmental planners require that departmental
intelligence organizations exploit widely the capabilities of the
entire community. This broad reliance, or interdependence,
supposes an effective coordination mechanism, or at least knowledge
at the appropriate level that these capabilities exist, as well as

how they can be tapped. One device for accomplishing this is a training program for senior officers.

7. **Potential Objections.** Objections to the proposed program fall into two general categories; personnel and budgetary. The latter category will not be considered here; however, Annex 2 gives some insight into this factor. Some of the objections regarding personnel which will be raised are as follows:

    a. The valuable employee who would be eligible and logically selected for such training cannot be spared from his job.

    b. The valuable employee can be spared but only for a short period of time.

    c. The upper or middle echelon employee has prestige interests and feels that he does not need training.

Since any training program is an investment for the Agency, objections a. and b. can easily be discounted if the program serves the purpose. Objection c. can be overcome by constructing a program using instructional devices which will satisfy prestige needs.

8. **Recommendations.** It is hereby recommended

    a. That this proposal be made the subject of study by USIB or one of its sub-committees to determine the feasibility and desirability of such a program.

    b. That, if the proposal is worthy of further detailed staff work, one or two persons, with CIA Office of Training officers as the principal, conduct such staff work to prepare for further approval and implementation of the proposal.

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Attachments:
  Annex 1 - Course Outline for a United
        States Intelligence Staff
        College
  Annex 2 - Some Administrative Con-
        siderations for a USISC